Algebraic cryptanalysis usually requires to recover the secret key by solving polynomial equations. Faugè re's F4 is a well-known Gröbner bases algorithm to solve this problem. However, a serious drawback exists in the Gröbner bases based algebraic attacks, namely, any information won't be got if we couldn't work out the Gröbner bases of the polynomial equations system. In this paper, we in-depth research the F4 algorithm over GF(2). By using S-polynomials to replace critical pairs and computing the normal form of the productions with respect to the field equations in certain steps, many "redundant" reductors are avoided during the computation process of the F4 algorithm. By slightly modifying the logic of F4 algorithm, we solve the univariate polynomials appeared in the algorithm and then back-substitute the values of the solved variables at each iteration of the algorithm. We call our improvements Middle-Solving F4. The heuristic strategy of Middle-Solving overcomes the drawback of algebraic attacks and well suits algebraic attacks. It has never been applied to the Gröbner bases algorithm before. Experiments to some Hidden Field Equation instances and some classical benchmarks (Cyclic 6, Gonnet83) show that Middle-Solving F4 is faster and uses less memory than Faugè re's F4.
INTRODUCTION
As one of the most efficient attacks, algebraic attacks have been successful in breaking several stream ciphers, public key cryptosystems, and a few block ciphers.
Algebraic attacks try to reformulate a cipher as a (very large) system of polynomial equations and then find the secret key by solving such a system. In this paper, we focus on the polynomial system solving part. The problem of solving polynomial systems over finite fields is known to be very difficult (non-deterministic polynomial-time hard complete in general). The security of many cryptographic systems is based on this problem, which makes developing algorithms for solving polynomial systems be a hot research topic in cryptanalysis.
Gröbner bases, first introduced in [6] , are by now a fundamental tool for tracking this problem and become a powerful method for algebraic attacks. In addition, Gröbner bases can be used to determine optimal equations in terms of degree and/or variables in the algebraic attacks. What's more, Albrecht and Cid [14] use Gröbner bases algorithms to perform a consistency check. This allows them to determine whether given pair satisfies the considered differential characteristic. Cryptanalysis involving the Gröbner bases algorithms has been claimed to attack many cryptosystems: multivariate public key cryptosystems such as HFE [1] , Minrank [2] , McEliece [3] , stream ciphers such as Bivium [4] , hash function such as SHA-1 [5] .
Finding Gröbner bases is a difficult task, which requires lots of computational resources. Algorithms to compute Gröbner bases have evolved a great deal since the first one was proposed in 1965 by Bruno Buchberger [6] . A significant leap in performance was achieved with the introduction of the F4 [7] and F5 [8] algorithms by Jean-Charles Faugè re. In fact, F4 and F5 can be regarded as the two sides of Faugè re's algorithm: F4 algorithm uses Gaussian elimination to speed up the time-consuming step of "critical pair" reductions. F5 algorithm uses a more powerful criterion to remove useless critical pairs. In recent years, many new variants of F5 are proposed and discussed, for example, EF5 [9] , F5C [10] , G2V [11] , GVW [12] and many other algorithms. However, the research of F4 is mainly focus on the implementation of algorithm. Therefore, its theory needs a further research.
A variant of F4 is designed by Antoine Joux and Vanessa Vitse [15] at SCC10 to compute the Gröbner bases of a set of polynomial systems having the similar shape.
Their variant consists of the two routines F4Precomp and F4Remake. For precomputation purposes, F4Precomp run the original F4 algorithm on the first system and store only the useful polynomial multiples ( , ) ii uf coming from the critical pairs. For each subsequent system, run the F4Remake to directly work on the previously stored multiples ( , ) ii uf. A little unfortunately, the applicability of Antoine Joux's variant is somewhat limiting. Firstly, maybe we couldn't get the Gröbner bases from F4Precomp if the initial system is difficult to solve. Secondly, polynomial systems having the similar shape doesn't mean they are the same. A little difference may lead error in the F4Remake. It is hard to guarantee the correctness of the algorithm.
In cryptanalysis, any information leakages may result in serious threat to cryptosystems. However, a serious drawback exists in the Gröbner bases based algebraic attacks, namely, we won't get any information if we couldn't work out the Gröbner bases of the polynomial equations system. In addition, lots of the cryptosystems are defined over GF (2) . So computing the Gröbner bases over GF(2) is especially important. In this paper, our goals are to accelerate the F4 algorithm over GF (2) and make Gröbner bases be more practical for algebraic attacks. By using S-polynomials to replace critical pair and computing the normal form of the productions ( ii uf) with respect to the field equations in certain steps, many "redundant" reductors are avoided. By slightly modifying the logic of F4 algorithm, we solve the univariate polynomials appeared in the algorithm and then back-substitute the values of the solved variables at each iteration of the algorithm. In our algorithm, even though we couldn't work out the Gröbner bases, some information of the variable still leak during the computation process. We call our variant Middle-Solving F4. We must stress that the heuristic strategy of Middle-Solving has never been applied to Gröbner bases algorithms until now. We mention that our heuristic strategy, by design, will boost the performance of all Gröbner bases algorithms in the same way as it aids F4 algorithm. We present experimental results to demonstrate that the Middle-Solving strategy has the ability to improve the F4 algorithm drastically, and make algebraic attacks be more practical.
The paper is structured as follows. First we do some preliminaries in Sect. 2. In Sect.3 we do some small improvements to make F4 be more adapted for the finite fields over GF (2) . In Sect. 4 we describe our Middle-Solving F4 and introduce experimental results on various benchmark systems in Sect. 5. Sect. 6 concludes this paper.
PRELIMINARIES
This section describes the fundamental notations and the conventions in this paper.
We briefly give the main definitions needed to define a Gröbner bases in a characterization useful for our purpose and simply describe the F4 algorithm.
Basic Knowledge
Let K be a field and 
with respect to T  is a finite list G of polynomials in I that satisfies the properties = GI  and for every pI  there exists gG  satisfying
Buchberger first found an algorithm to compute such a basis [6] .
We describe Buchberger's algorithm in the following way and introduce some definitions at the same time: set G=F, then iterate the following two steps.
 Choose a pair , p q G  that has not yet been considered, and construct its 
F4
The reduction of selected pairs is by far the biggest time-consuming part of the . For a more detailed discussion we refer the reader to [7] .
The Gröbner bases of F.
Initialization:
: G  and :
()
F  := Reduction to Row Echelon Form of F w.r.t. < 3.
:
 for some fG  and some mT  8.
() There exists a (unique)
ADAPTING F4 FOR THE FINITE FIELDS OVER GF(2)
In order to detect some hidden property of F4 over GF (2) . We must adapt F4 for the finite fields over GF(2) by using some property of GF (2) . And then we accelerate the speed of F4 algorithm over GF (2) without changing the framework of F4 algorithm.
Taking the Field Equations into Account
For cryptographic purpose, solutions in the algebraic closure are irrelevant for us. In fact, taking the field equations into account for Gröbner bases algorithm has also been discussed previously. We mention it here, it is just because it is a foundation of our following improvements. In addition, we want to stress its importance for F4
by some experiments and in Sec.5 we will give the real reason why adding field equations have the ability to improve the efficiency of the algorithm. Experimental results to compare Field-equations-adding F4 (FE-F4 for short) with the original F4
for some HFE systems and some classical benchmarks (Cyclic 6, Gonnet83) are presented in Table 1 . The total time in seconds and the max memory in Megabytes are
represented by "Time" and "Max-mem" respectively. From the experimental results,
we can see adding field equations has the ability to improve the F4 algorithm drastically. 
Critical Pair or S-polynomial?
In a sense, S-polynomial is equivalent to critical pair. However, after taking the field equations into account and doing some special processing during the F4 algorithm over GF(2), there exists a greatly different impact on process of Reduction between the using of S-polynomials and critical pairs. Preprocessing respectively. For convenience, we name the improvement S-F4.
Algorithm 5 Reduction
Algorithm 6 Symbolic Preprocessing
Input:
if m top reducible module G then 7. m = () m HT f  for some fG  and some mT 
8.
Remark. "NF" is the abbreviation for "Normal Form"
MIDDLE-SOLVING F4
In this section, we will slightly modify the logic of the F4 algorithm to make it be more practical for cryptanalysis (especially algebraic attacks) to solve cryptosystems over GF (2) .
Usually, the key of algebraic attacks is solving multivariate polynomial equations.
Gröbner bases is one of the most efficient algorithms to solve the system of equations.
More precisely, we can decompose the algorithm in two distinct steps when we use Gröbner bases to solve the system of equations: first we should compute the Gröbner bases of the initial polynomials system, then we get the value of the variables from the Gröbner bases with other algorithm (e.g. with Berlekamp's algorithm). Gröbner bases just serves as an intermediate step to solve systems of polynomial equations symbolically. In the suitable term orders (e.g. lexicographical orders), the solutions of the Gröbner bases can be easily computed by successively eliminating variables.
However, a serious drawback exists in the Gröbner bases based algebraic attacks, namely, we won't get any information if we couldn't work out the Gröbner bases of the polynomial equations system. This drawback greatly restricts the practicability of algebraic attacks. Our goal is to overcome this drawback, getting some information during the computation process of F4 algorithm and accelerating the F4 algorithm.
In many experiments with our improved F4 algorithm described Section.3, we have observed that after the Gaussian elimination step certain univariate polynomials appear. They are just treated like any other polynomials in the F4 algorithm. We must stress here that our ultimate aim is to obtain the solution of the initial equations system, not the Gröbner bases of the initial equations system. If those univariate polynomials have only one solution, they could be used beneficially in the algorithms.
We show that they should deserve a special treatment. For the practical purposes, we slightly modify the logic of the F4 algorithm. At each iteration of the algorithm, solve these univariate polynomials and back-substitute the values of the solved variables to all polynomials in the set of middle bases G, the set of critical pairs P, and the set  .
And then delete the zero elements in these sets. We can image that the benefits of such improvement is huge. It will cause a series of chain reactions, this makes the whole algorithm get relatively simpler than before, even though only a value of one variant is obtained. And even though we couldn't work out the Gröbner bases, some information of the variable still leak during the computation process. We name our improvement Middle-Solving F4. We must stress that the heuristic strategy of Middle-Solving has never been applied to Gröbner bases algorithms until now. We mention that our heuristic strategy, by design, will boost the performance of all Gröbner bases algorithms in the same way as it aids F4 algorithm. : G  and :
( , ) :
11. if UP is not Empty then 12.
13. for r in R do 14.
root := Solve(UnivariatePolynomial(r)); In this section, experimental results are presented to compare our improvement to Faugè re's F4. We take an interest in solving systems of some classical benchmarks (Cyclic 6 , Gonnet83) and some HFE(17,n) cryptosystems generated by Segers [13] , where 17 is the degree restriction of the hidden polynomial used to generate the public key polynomials, n is number of variables and generated polynomials. The implementations in this section are all written by Magma version (V2.11-11). Our F4 program is written according to the pseudo code of Faugè re's F4 and not join other implementation techniques, such as sparse matrix techniques, etc. We regard it as a benchmark for our improvement to prove the effectiveness of our improvement. So  The total number of reductors considered, which is denoted by "Reductor".
15.

Renew(G,P,
 The highest degree of final Gröbner bases, which is denoted by "H-Deg-GB".
 The number of final Gröbner bases, which is denoted by "#GB". Table 2 gives some key datas during the computation process of the experiments we did in Table 1 . From Table 2 , we can easily get the reason that why adding field equations has the ability to improve the F4 algorithm drastically over GF (2) . After adding the field equations to the initial equations system, the number of critical pairs considered and the largest number of rows in the reduction matrix decrease drastically. This is mainly because that lots of the redundant critical pairs are avoided by the Gebauer-Möller Criterion during the update phase. And the limitation of the exponents of the variables also plays a very important role. The datas need to be computed decease a lot, so it is not surprising that the time and the max memory decrease as described in Table 1 . We notice that the highest degree of final Gröbner bases decrease a lot. It is simpler for us to solve the Gröbner bases by other algorithm.
Adding field equations to the initial equations system can accelerate the F4 algorithm and needs less memory. So we regard the FE-F4 as a benchmark. The following experiment results of our variants all compare to the FE-F4 unless stated. 
